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Abstract
Economic integration affects economic development through two main
channels : growth and localization of the economic activities. The theories
of endogenous growth and economic geography enable us to understand
these mechanisms. We study in this paper their similarities and speci-
ficities before suggesting their useful combination within a single model.
Indeed, both theories are based on the same Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz mo-
nopolistic competition framework. However, they suggest two different
approaches to deal with the impact of economic integration. We consider
that a third path, by proposing a synthetic approach, better answers the
issues raised in terms of economic convergence and divergence by these
two sets of models.
Keywords : regional economic integration, endogenous growth, eco-
nomic geography
JEL classification : F12, F15, F43, O18, O30, O41, R11, R12, R13
1 Introduction
The question that new growth and new geography theories are trying to answer
is the following : How (new growth) and where (new geography) new goods and
new firms are created ? Our answer goes through the construction of a model of
synthesis between new growth and new geography theories to answer the how
and where since the two are connected and interdependent. Our objective is
indeed to show that the combination of growth and geography theories allows
us to better understand the linkages between growth and location.
Indeed, a clear geographical dimension is present in growth theories through
spillovers and likewise a growth dimension is present in geography theories
through ad hoc dynamics (comparative static). As a result, it appears that
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economic concentration explains growth through the innovation and production
process. Not only are the questions connected, the assumptions are also similar
(Section 2). However, there still remains some clear specificities for both sets of
theories (Section 3) that allow us to propose a synthetic framework (Section 4).
2 The similarities between new geography and
new growth theories
New trade, new growth and new geography theories all rely on a common frame-
work based on economies of scale and monopolistic competition. The existence
of increasing returns to scale (IRS) and imperfect competition seems to be a
rather realistic view of the structure of many industries and play a major role in
the explanation of trade, location and the creation of knowledge. For instance,
trade between similar countries can be explained if we allow for country-specific
economies of scale, since these can foster specialization (even if countries have
identical relative factor endowments). (IRS) also explain intra-industry trade
(Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Moreover, the possibility of profiting from
imperfect competition to invent new goods and the existence of public good
features for knowledge contribute to explain economic growth.
As soon as we introduce positive externalities in trade, we have to depart
from the traditional trade theory and rely on models allowing scale economies
to trade in differentiated goods. Not until scale economies and imperfect com-
petition had been incorporated into static theory could dynamic theories of the
relationship between trade and technology evolve. Since externalities emerge as
a consequence of market interactions involving economies of scale at the level
of the individual firm, thus we must model an imperfectly competitive mar-
ket structure : the workhorse is the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic
competition and the particular formalization of Ethier (1982). Basically, this
framework shows that the more differentiation, the more varieties, the more
intense the specialization into a set of varieties, the more IRS (Section 2.1).
In a dynamic setting, the impact of external effects and of capital accumula-
tion and the existence of differentiated goods in presence of economic integration
has been analyzed by Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a and 1991b) and Gross-
man and Helpman (1991a and 1991b) combining new trade and new growth
theories. These authors show that since most of the costs of developing a new
technology occur before production begins and do not vary with the intended
scale of output, innovation normally gives rise to dynamic scale economies. And
since firms typically cover the costs of their up-front investments by exploiting
market power generated by their inventions, innovation gives rise to imperfect
competition (Section 2.2).
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2.1 Increasing returns to scale
IRS 1 provide an interesting mechanism linking integration and growth. Indeed,
trade openness, by increasing the size of the market for the producers, leads to
greater specialization and - in the average - to a higher scale of production. The
trade literature suggests then that trade is beneficial if it brings an expansion
of the IRS sector. For instance, we expect that the smaller the country, the
more it gains from trade due to international economies of scale. Ohlin (1933)
had already recognized the complementary effect of IRS to differences in factor
endowments in explaining trade. Another approach, relying more on dynamic
economics, considers that trade in intermediate inputs raises both the level and
rate of economic growth. In both sets of theories, free-trade fosters growth.
There are two main types of externalities. With external economies of scale,
the doubling of the production factors by one firm doubles its production, but
the doubling of the production factors by all the firms more than double the
global production (Section 2.1.1). With internal economies of scale, the doubling
of the production factors by one firm more than double its production (Section
2.1.2).
2.1.1 External economies of scale
There could be external economies of scale resulting from the inability of firms
to appropriate knowledge completely. Here, the question of the diffusion of
knowledge and of its extent is crucial. If we accept that goods contain ideas
and that these ideas can be decrypted by importers, then diffusion can become
international even in the case of private knowledge. Indeed, most of the sources
of the economies of scale (and of imperfect competition) will depend on a dy-
namic process implying knowledge diffusion. The introduction of knowledge in
the framework points towards dynamic models. Indeed, in Helpman-Krugman
(1985), the wish to bring the analysis of trade at the dynamic level is mentioned
and will be completed by Grossman-Helpman (1991a). Even if we keep the ex-
ternal economies of scale without considering the role of internal economies, we
still need to determine the scope of these economies : national or international.
As Ethier (1979) pointed out, if these scale economies arise in the production
of intermediate goods that are tradable, then these economies apply also at the
international level.
2.1.2 Internal economies of scale
When IRS are occurring at the firm level, a larger firm can take advantage of
more specialization to become more efficient. Moreover, some costs are indepen-
dent of the scale of production and will thus fall per unit as production increases.
The persistence of internal economies of scale is then inconsistent with competi-
tive equilibria. With IRS, marginal cost pricing implies losses since price-taking
1Pecuniary externalities describe benefits from interactions through market transactions
whereas technological externalities deal with the effects of interactions outside the market
(e.g. information flows) that appear in an invisible fashion.
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behavior is inconsistent with non-negative profits and thus market cannot be
perfectly competitive. Therefore, IRS require a market structure that allows for
prices above marginal cost. Internal scale economies must involve imperfectly
competitive markets where monopoly profits may be earned by firms unless they
are eliminated by entry.
Likewise, technical change is not easily modelled in the traditional neo-
classical framework due to its incompatibility with the usual hypothesis of per-
fect competition. Technical change assumes new ideas, whose exclusivity is only
partial, and that possess some features of public goods. This is however correct
to assume that the traditional factors such as capital and labor display CRS
since they are exclusive (divisible). However, when we consider ideas as fac-
tors of production, returns to scale tend to be increasing. The problem is that
IRS contradict perfect competition. Due to the invention of new ideas, older
ideas are thus replaced because of their obsolescence and their value becomes
nil (as their marginal cost of production). Then, there is no incentive to pur-
sue research and create new ideas. Monopolistic competition will provide the
necessary incentives.
2.2 Monopolistic competition
The monopolistic competition model considers that there are sectors consisting
of many products produced with the same production function. In a sector
whose product is differentiated and where each variety is produced with IRS
(these are relatively small so that the industry can accommodate many pro-
ducers, each one producing a different variety) intraindustry trade is possible
2 . Then, following Chamberlin (1933), it is natural to expect in this industry a
market structure known as monopolistic competition where every firm chooses
a variety and its pricing so as to maximize profits, taking as given the variety
of choice and pricing strategy of the other producers in the industry. In this
case, every firm ends up producing a different variety of the product. We will
see in more details how monopolistic competition is built in the Spence-Dixit-
Stiglitz framework (Section 2.2.1) and then, adapted to a growth setting, in the
Romer-Grossman-Helpman framework (Section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz modelling
Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) developed a formalization of Cham-
berlin’s concept of monopolistic competition, becoming the most used model of
competition in the presence of IRS, first in new trade, then in new growth and
finally in new geography, implying that these three theories are, in terms of
their market structure, indeed very closely related. When preferences are of the
Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz type, a single producer competes equally with every other
2 Indeed, comparative advantage drives specialization at the aggregative, sectorial interna-
tional level but economies of scale cause specialization at the level of individual products. So
we have the Heckscher-Ohlin interindustry specialization and a scale economy intraindustry
trade.
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producer, and he derives the same profit level for any variety choice that is not
supplied by others. If he were to choose a variety that is already supplied by
another firm, he would have to share the market for this variety, thereby ending
up with profits lower than those he could attain by adopting some other variety.
Therefore, no variety will be produced by more than one firm.
If there are no impediments to entry and exit in the differentiated goods
sector, then the number of firms is endogenously determined. If the number of
firms is large enough, then we expect entry and exit to lead to zero profits (at
the aggregate). In this case, the degree of monopoly power equals the degree
of economies of scale 3. Ethier (1979, 1982) has insisted that, when dealing
with product differentiation at the international level, we shall rather consider
the case of intermediates than the one of final goods. The taste for variety
and the range for specialization would in that case be even more fundamental
for intermediates than for final goods. The main restriction being the tradable
features of these intermediates.
Dixit-Stiglitz’s model assumes that many differentiated goods enter perfectly
symmetrically into demand; the individual utility function takes a rather par-
ticular form (CES) 4. However, it offers a way to respect the effects of IRS at
the level of the firm, is readily suitable for an analysis in terms of general equi-
librium and thanks to its use of a large number of firms in a continuum space
(there is a very large number of potential manufactured goods, so many that the
product space can be represented as continuous, enabling us to side-step integer
constraints on the number of goods), we can respect the integer nature of indi-
vidual choices under IRS (each good is typically produced in only one location)
while representing the aggregate of such choices with continuous variables (such
as the share of production carried out in a particular location).
The size of the market affects neither the mark-up of price over marginal
cost nor the scale at which individual goods are produced. As a result, all scale
effects work through changes in the varieties of goods available. Manufactur-
ing involves economies of scale that arise at the level of the variety (there are
no economies of scope). Normally, we think that larger markets mean more
intensive competition, and that one of the ways the economy takes advantage
of the extent of the market is by producing at larger scale. The Dixit-Stiglitz
model says, however, that all market-size effects work through changes in vari-
ety (see Fujita-Krugman-Venables, 1999, p. 52). Strategic interactions between
firms’ location decisions (Weber, 1909; Hotelling, 1929) are not addressed since
Hotelling treats the geographical distribution of demand and resources as exoge-
nous and analyzes the strategic interactions of firms. In our analysis, strategic
interactions are not central and the Dixit-Stiglitz framework allows us to focus
on the implications of endogenous location of demand and resources.
In Dixit-Stiglitz’s framework, the industrial good is symbolized by an in-
dex of consumption that imposes a constant and equal elasticity of substitu-
tion between every pair of goods as usual in context of product differentiation.
3See Helpman-Krugman (1985, chapter 7) for further details.
4 See Krugman (1995a and 1995b) and Neary (2000) for an account of the limitations of
the Dixit-Stiglitz model.
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However, as in Ethier (1982), the index can also be composed of differentiated
intermediate inputs and households consume a single homogenous consumption
good. New goods substitute imperfectly for old so that there is increasing diver-
sity in consumption 5. Total factor productivity (TFP) raises with the number
of available varieties due to the increasing degrees of specialization in produc-
tion (Ethier, 1982) or the larger number of finer production processes. This
approach of monopolistic competition is based on Bertrand competition : each
firm takes competitor’s prices as given. Furthermore, firms can differentiate
their products so that they are not perfect substitutes for either the products
of existing competitors or the products of potential entrants. Each firm acts as
a monopolist facing a downward-sloping demand curve.
One of the main interests of the Dixit-Stiglitz framework for the models of
new growth and new geography is that it allows to introduce vertical linkages
by assuming that manufacturing uses itself (in addition to labor) as an input.
Therefore, the same aggregate of manufacturing varieties demanded by con-
sumers is also an input into the production of each variety. Thus, the same
industry is both downstream, producing output for final consumption, and up-
stream. Likewise, in the growth models of Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1992, 1993),
the manufacturing sector produces two types of goods : a consumer good and a
producer good. However, for mathematical tractability, they consider that the
production function is the same in both cases so that there is possible conversion
into one another on a one-for-one basis. In that sense, the manufacturing sector
is both a supplier and customer from itself.
2.2.2 Romer-Grossman-Helpman modelling
These three authors provide an understanding of the importance of monopo-
listic competition in growth theory. In their models, population growth is nil
and returns to scale for the reproducible factors are constant in each sector.
R&D requires the use of high-skilled labor (human capital) and of the stock
of knowledge but not of physical capital. Knowledge is non-rival and partially
non-exclusive. The non-rivalry implies that the production and dispersion of
knowledge cannot be strictly managed by the private sector. Once the discov-
ery is made, the marginal cost to spill it over to a new user is nil. Hence, the
return for the inventor is also nil. In that sense, the wish to obtain a private
benefit cannot be at the origin of the R&D activity. The only way would be to
sell these products at a higher price than the marginal cost or that the public
sector for instance would subsidize knowledge. In any case, perfect competition
is not the most appropriate framework to discuss such issues.
The non-exclusivity stems from the relative difficulty for inventors to pro-
tect their inventions through patents or copyrights and prevent others to use
it without their consent. The degree of exclusivity is essential in influencing
the production and dispersion of knowledge. Without any exclusivity, private
benefits are impossible. Conversely, exclusivity, even partial, allows inventors to
5Homogeneity implies perfect substitutability (elasticity tends to infinity) and vice-versa
for differentiation.
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patent their inventions and get a positive return. The first case of no exclusivity
denotes pure research usually financed by the public sector. However, since this
type of research can be useful to the production, it forms a positive externality.
The other type or partial exclusivity allows inventors to capture some market
power. An easy way to model this activity is to consider that the inventor has
the exclusive control over the use of his idea and grants licenses to producers of
the goods made from his idea.
Indeed, if you consider that new ideas require a voluntary effort in R&D
and spread slowly to other producers, then the imperfect competition frame-
work shall be more suitable. In that framework, first proposed by Romer (1987,
1990) and then Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Aghion and Howitt (1992),
technological change stems from a voluntary R&D effort. The R&D activity is
financed by ex-post monopoly power. However, in order to encourage R&D,
innovators shall be rewarded. Since new ideas are costly but can be shared
without strict exclusivity, this implies that other firms can use the idea of an-
other firm without having to pay for it. Then, there is no ex-ante incentive
without a system of patents. Thus, this requires that the inventor obtains a
monopoly power over the production and sale of the invented good. Thanks
to these profits, protected by patents or secrecy, inventors have an incentive to
create 6.
Deliberate investments in knowledge require an environment where intellec-
tual property rights are protected. Without such protection, investors cannot
appropriate the fruits of their labor. A patent or trade secret typically gives an
innovator the ability to exercise monopoly power in the product market. That
is, a firm with proprietary access to an innovative technology usually can price
above marginal cost without losing all of its sales. And the more unique and
superior the innovator’s technology, the greater will be the monopoly power and
the larger the reward (Arrow, 1962). This explains why imperfect competition
features prominently in these models.
Profits must recover in response to the exit of firms to provide proper entry
signals. In the static theory of monopolistic competition, the existence of a
traditional fixed cost is sufficient to guarantee stability : entry of new firms
crowds out labor supply per firm, thus raising the share of fixed cost in total
cost and reducing profits until they are wiped out. In a dynamic model of
monopolistic competition, total fixed cost per firm is not exogenous but can be
reduced by diminishing research efforts. Crowding out of labor supply per firm
by the entrance of new firms needs not lead to a reduction in instantaneous
profits if firms decide to reduce research employment to offset the larger burden
of the fixed management expenditures. Such a decision will not be taken if the
intertemporal gains from research are relatively high.
6The period of monopoly is in any case reduced by obsolescence or imitation.
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3 The specificities of new geography and new
growth theories
Although based on similar characteristics, new geography and new growth the-
ories still display specific features. One feature of new geography is its reliance
on internal IRS, comparative statics and partly numerical results. New geog-
raphy uses comparative static or ad hoc dynamics where one of the variables
(the location of labor or of firms) moves over time. Moreover, it does not rely
on inter-temporal decisions based on rational expectations by individual agents.
Conversely, new growth provides a dynamic framework with analytical solutions
and external IRS.
Another distinction between the two sets of theories is their point of depar-
ture : the first Marshallian explanation of economic concentration (the diffusion
of knowledge through technological externalities) for new growth, whereas Krug-
man (1991) and Venables (1996), in their geographic models, are interested in
the two other explanations : the pooling of labor and the variety of differentiated
goods through forward and backward linkages (e.g. pecuniary externalities). We
will first review some specific features of the new economic geography (Section
3.1) and then some particular characteristics of the new growth theory (Section
3.2).
3.1 Economic geography and agglomeration economies
Economic geography is the study of where economic activity takes place and
why. Agglomeration is the clustering of economic activity, created and sus-
tained by some sort of circular cumulative causality. Economic geography tries
to derive spatial concentration from the interactions among economies of scale,
transportation costs and factor mobility. The geographical distribution of eco-
nomic activities is indeed determined by the interaction between economies of
scale, which support the concentration of production in large markets, and trade
costs, which also imply its presence in small markets. Concentration of economic
activity prospers because of agglomeration economies and its self-reinforcing
process.
Despite the fundamental contributions of Lösch (1940), Harris (1954) or
Pred (1966), this is only recently that a proper analytical framework for market
structure has been built. According to Krugman (1991, 1995a, 1995b, 1997,
1998), this is due to the lack of models associating IRS and imperfect competi-
tion as suggested by Hotelling (1929), Lösch (1940) or Koopmans (1957) 7. We
will first review the learning of the older theories (Section 3.1.1), then of the
new theories (Section 3.1.2), and finally provide some elements on the role of
transaction costs as a proxy for trade liberalization on the spatial structure of
the economy (Section 3.1.3).
7Hotelling (1929) proposed a model where space and localization were considered as strate-
gic factors in firms behavior. A detailed presentation of theories of economic geography can
be found in Fujita-Krugman-Venables (1999), Neary (2000) and Fujita and Thisse (2002).
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3.1.1 Old geography learning
Most of the concepts currently used in new economic geography were elaborated
by several economists over the last century. Among others, we shall note the
works concerned with :
- The central-place of Christaller (1933) and Lösch (1940) : The trade-off
between scale economies and transportation costs leads to the emergence of a
lattice of central-places, each serving the surrounding farmers.
- The market potential of Harris (1954) : Producers prefer sites with good
access to consumers, but also access to markets tend to be good in regions in
which many firms chose to produce. Linkages stories work only if there are
increasing returns to production at the level of the individual firm; otherwise,
the firm would not concentrate production where the market is largest, but
rather establish a separate facility to serve each market. But if there are IRS,
competition must be imperfect.
- The base-multiplier of Pred (1966) : The export activities are a region’s
economic base, whereas the non-base activities are derived from that base’s
performance. As the region expands, local income grows. A cumulative process
begins when underlying parameters cross some critical value. Although these
break and sustain points are not always the same.
- Henderson (1974) : There is a tension between external economies asso-
ciated with geographic concentration of industries and diseconomies (such as
congestion costs and pollution) associated with large cities. The net effect of
this tension is that the relationship between the size of an economy and the
utility of a representative resident is an inverted U curve. External economies
tend to be specific to particular related industries, but diseconomies tend to
depend on the overall size of a city, whatever it produces.
- When we assume external economies to decline with distance, we obtain
a von Thünen-type trade-off between a centripetal force due to the external
economies that pulls employment into concentrated districts and a centrifugal
force where business locates in low-rent locations away from the concentrated
centres and attracts workers at lower wages.
3.1.2 New geography learning
New geography has drawn from these previous studies and benefited from new
tools and modelling tricks from industrial organization and new trade theories.
The set of studies that interests us has been focusing on the interaction between
concentration and dispersion forces along the varying level of transaction costs
8 .
Sustain point and break point New geography tries to answer the two
following questions :
8Empirical contributions on this issue include among others : Brülhart (1996, 1998), Brül-
hart and Torstensson (1996), Davis and Weinstein (1999) and Hanson (1996, 1997a, 1997b,
1998a, 1998b).
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- When is a spatial concentration of economic activity sustainable ? If all
manufacturing is concentrated in one region, a worker who defects to the other
region might find that doing so improves his real wage; if it does, the concen-
tration of manufacturing is not an equilibrium. This is what defines the sustain
point. More explicitly : does, in a core-periphery framework, a small group of
workers moving from the North to the South receive a higher real wage than
received by the workers remaining behind ? If so, a core-periphery is not an
equilibrium : manufacturing will shift over time to the peripheral region. If not,
a core-periphery pattern is an equilibrium : the concentration of manufacturing
will be self-sustaining.
- When is a symmetric equilibrium, without spatial concentration, unstable ?
Starting from an equilibrium in which manufacturing is equally divided between
the two regions, a movement of a small number of workers from one region to
the other raises or lowers the relative wage in the destination; if it raises it, the
symmetric initial situation is unstable against small perturbations. This is what
defines the break point. Note that sustain point occurs before break point.
We see that the answers to both of these questions hinge on the balance be-
tween centripetal forces that tend to promote spatial concentration of economic
activity, and centrifugal forces that oppose such concentration.
Concentration and dispersion forces We display the opposite forces along
the following repartition. 1) Concentration or centripetal forces are : vertical
linkages, thick markets, local knowledge spillovers and intermediate transporta-
tion costs. 2) Dispersion or centrifugal forces are : immobile factors, land rent
/ commuting, congestion costs, wage differentials, global knowledge spillovers
and high and low transportation costs. We shall also introduce an important
distinction. At the regional level, core-periphery is possible because labor is
mobile. However, at the national level, core-periphery is less possible because
labor is immobile 9 .
a) Concentration force : A larger manufacturing labor force makes a
region more attractive both because the larger local market leads to higher
nominal wages (backward linkage) and because the larger variety of locally pro-
duced goods lowers the price index (forward linkage). If a region gains a slightly
larger manufacturing sector, that sector would grow overtime while the other
region’s manufacturing sector shrank, leading eventually to a core-periphery
pattern with all manufacturing concentrated in one region (the symmetric equi-
librium is unstable for medium trade costs but stable for high trade costs).
Agglomeration of manufacturing in the North causes a discontinuous upward
jump in real wages in the North and a fall in the South. The labor demand
generated by manufacturing raises North’s wage, measured relatively to agri-
cultural goods. And the country with manufacturing has a lower cost-of-living
index, because it does not have to pay τ on imported manufactures. This effect
9 In this literature, the distinction between regional and national levels depends on the
mobility of labor. National borders are associated with barriers to labor mobility.
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amplifies North’s gain and also drives the decline in real wages in the South. A
firm in the South, the small market, experiences a transport cost disadvantage
in supplying the North, the large market, so that it cannot afford to pay a nom-
inal wage as high as in the North. The size of the wage gap between the two
countries may continue to increase over some interval of trade costs. Eventually,
however, the wage gap declines with transport costs; in the limit, as these costs
go to 0, factor prices are equalized (the value of proximity to customer and
supplier firms vanishes as transport costs fall) and the symmetric equilibrium
becomes stable once again.
Income growth increases demand for manufactures relative to agriculture,
and this manufacturing growth is concentrated in the North. This has two
effects on the sustain condition. Because it increases North’s wage, it makes
it more attractive for manufacturing to set up in the South. But, precisely
because the North is manufacturing more and paying higher wages, the share
of the North in world manufacturing expenditure rises, and this strengthens
backward linkages and reinforces the existing agglomeration.
b) Dispersion force : We have seen that agglomeration results from pe-
cuniary externalities associated with increasing returns to scale and transporta-
tion costs. Firms locating in densely populated areas save money in terms of
fixed costs by concentrating production in a single factory, and on transporta-
tion costs by locating close to the big market. However, agglomeration creates
congestion costs, since firms in concentrated areas have to compensate workers
by paying them with higher wages than in peripheral regions (Krugman and
Livas, 1996).
Likewise, agglomeration requires that workers live in a confined area, this
increases pollution, rents and necessary extra infrastructure to face congestion
constraints. While firms in the center pay their workers at a higher fee, firms
in the periphery have to pay their own workers at a lower fee in order to com-
pensate for the transportation costs. Fortunately, these workers may accept
these lower wages since they are confronted with lower congestion costs. One
of the dispersion force is indeed that firms move towards regions that offer low
wages and away from regions that offer high wages. So that the distribution of
manufacturing evolves over time to the extent that wages differ across regions.
Finally, it appears that at high transportation costs (high τ), the symmetric
equilibrium is unique, because each country must have manufacturing to supply
its local consumers. The dominant force in determining location is the need to
be close to final consumption, preventing any strong geographical concentration
of manufacturing. At low τ , the dominant determinant of location is wage costs,
again urging dispersed manufacturing to keep labor costs down.
c) The life-cycle of development Countries that industrialize first do so
by developing industries that are especially labor-intensive or that are weakly
linked to other sectors. Technical progress (exogenous) steadily augments all
primary factors. If linkages between industries (so-called Jacobs linkages) are
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stronger than within, concentration is never sustainable and nations tend to de-
velop a diversified mix. Conversely if MAR linkages (so-called Marshall-Arrow-
Romer linkages or linkages within industry) apply, concentration is sustainable
for low τ . After relocation, the industry in the South can build its own linkages
and the catch up process goes on and accelerates.
Successful industrialization, however, raises manufacturing employment in
the South and raises wages and thus eventually prepares the way for the spread
of industry to yet another country. The most labor-intensive industry or the
one with low intermediate input requirements (since it is less dependent on
supply from other firms) is the first to leave the North, because they are more
responsive to high wages that cause the relocation of industry. The less labor
intensive will follow suit at an increasing pace due to the dynamic of vertical
linkages in the new location 10.
3.1.3 The role of transportation costs
According to new economic geography, very high as well as very low transaction
costs favor dispersion forces and intermediate transaction costs favor concen-
tration forces 11. At sufficiently high transport costs, there is a unique stable
equilibrium in which manufacturing is evenly divided between the regions. An
increase in one region’s industrial labor force reduces the real wage there, be-
cause it increases the supply of manufactures that cannot be exported. When
transport costs fall below some critical level, new stable equilibria emerge in
which all manufacturing is concentrated in one region. The forward-backward
linkages associated with the relocation of workers raise the real wage in the lo-
cation to which workers are moving and the symmetric equilibrium is unstable
(sustain point). When they fall below a second critical level, the asymmet-
ric equilibrium becomes unstable (break point). Chronologically, we go from
asymmetry (sustain point) to symmetry (break point).
At high and low trade costs, each country employs half its labor force in
each industry: at high τ because of the need to serve final consumers, and at
low τ because of factor supply considerations. At high trade costs, the demand-
side centrifugal force created by immobile consumers outweighs concentration
forces, causing manufacturing to be spread out. Likewise, at low trade costs, the
supply-side centrifugal force created by the need to import agricultural goods
also outweighs concentration forces. This is the non-monotonic effect of trade
costs on the pattern of agglomeration. In between there is a range in which
agglomeration is sustainable, and a narrower range in which the diversified equi-
librium is unstable. At intermediate τ , there is an intermediate range between
sustain and break points, at which there are three stable equilibria. Therefore
10See FKV (1999) for a detailed analysis.
11The larger the share of manufacturing workers in the economy, the greater the range
of τ in which the symmetric equilibrium is unstable (because of vertical linkages). A high
degree of product differentiation and large price cost mark-ups, and hence strong forward-
backward linkages all this conduct to a higher specialization and greater IRS. The range of
transport costs in which the core-periphery geography occurs is greater the larger the share
of manufactures in the economy, and the larger are firms’ price cost mark-ups.
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the linkage forces that can cause agglomeration are strongest relative to other
forces at intermediate values of τ . Thus, there is an inverted-U relationship
between τ and the geographic concentration of industry 12 .
3.2 Economic growth and technical change
Since Solow (1956), neoclassical growth theory had dominated the way economists
dealt with long-term growth in the sense of a capital accumulation process.
New growth theories have suggested new insights inside the accumulation pro-
cess whether through learning-by-doing (Romer, 1986; Stockey, 1988; Young,
1991), human capital accumulation (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Stockey, 1991)
or knowledge capital accumulation (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman,
1991a; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). This is essentially this third path we will
follow in our analysis. The new theory of growth analyzes the circumstances
for which capital (physical, human or knowledge) is not subject to decreasing
returns and allows for continued growth. In that framework, growth is deter-
mined endogenously and a change in economic policy that modifies the return
on capital accumulation may have permanent growth effects.
Growth proceeds deterministically through the creation of new durables that
increase the productivity of the production process. Growth is defined as the de-
velopment of new differentiated intermediate products conducting to permanent
gains in productivity in the production of the final goods. Growth depends thus
on knowledge that increases marginal product of labor and decreases innovation
cost in creating new products. This technological progress (the Solow residual)
is in fact not a purely random exogenous process but rather one guided by mar-
ket forces, that results from intentional industrial innovation, that is, from the
allocation of resources to R&D in response to perceived profit opportunities 13 .
We will first review the theoretical foundations of the growth theories (Section
3.2.1), then we will discuss the role of innovation in the growth process (Section
3.2.2) and finally the relationship between trade and knowledge spillovers as an
engine for growth (Section 3.2.3).
3.2.1 Model of Ramsey, Cass and Koopmans
This model is based on microeconomic foundations as proposed by Ramsey
(1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). Changes in capital stock depend on
the confrontation between optimal choices of households and firms that interact
on competitive markets. Firms produce and sell to households and other firms
an homogenous good by using labor and capital inputs. Households offer the
labor, own the capital, consume the good and save. Firms maximize profits
12 If transport costs are nil or low enough, trade is, in terms of welfare, unambiguously
beneficial. However, a lowering of transport costs has three effects : a direct gain from
reduced transport costs, a gain from that part of increased exports which represents a net
addition to production, but also a loss due to that part of imports which substitutes for
domestic shipments. The sum of the three effects is ambiguous (see Dion, 2003).
13A detailed presentation of endogenous growth theories can be found in Grossman and
Helpman (1991a), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Aghion and Howitt (1998).
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considering that households are the owners of the firms. Firms have access to a
technology that allows them to transform factors of production into goods.
In this model, households earn wages for their work and interest rates on
their assets. They buy and consume goods and accumulate savings as new assets.
There is interaction between generations in the sense that current households
maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint whose horizon is infinite.
Although households are mortal, their family is immortal. We thus assume that
parents are partly altruistic and make transfers to their children.
If we consider that capital accumulation (even if human capital is included)
faces decreasing returns and thus does not allow long-term growth, we have to
look for another factor to help us understand what empirics show : long-term
growth. Our main culprit may well be technological change (improvement in the
methods of production and rise in the quantity and quality of new varieties of
products) as a way to avoid decreasing returns over the long run. Endogenous
growth theorists have tried to determine the origin of technological progress
and thus help to understand how other factors such as trade could positively
influence long term growth.
The models dealing with product diversity study the increase in variety
for production goods or consumption goods. The more varieties, the more in-
dustries: this is the way innovation is taken into account. Arrow (1962) and
others have shown that knowledge can be approached in terms of know-how
and learning-by-doing (LBD) and is thus composed of positive externalities car-
ried out under market conditions. In that sense, it allows increasing returns to
scale at the aggregate level, whereas at the firm level we will still have constant
or decreasing returns to scale. In that framework, it was still possible to rely
on the traditional neo-classical theory with perfect competition. However, new
growth theory or endogenous growth theory relies on the idea that investment
in the form of R&D expenditure generates knowledge and innovation and hence
products of higher quality and quantity and eventually higher productivity.
3.2.2 Innovation and growth
There exist two different ways to introduce new goods : the accumulation of
experience through learning-by-doing (LBD) (Stockey, 1988, 1991; Young, 1991,
1995, 1998) and technological innovation through R&D (Romer, 1990; Grossman
and Helpman, 1991a; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). LBD is a type of product
useful for production processing and external from the economic decision taking
(perfect competition still applies). Innovation, however, considers R&D as an
investment highly profitable. Although an initial fixed cost has to be paid, it
will be compensated later (if research succeeds). New products may then be
commercialized at a fixed price above marginal cost. Since we assume that
knowledge is infinite, growth can keep on going.
However, due to the distortions created by the production of innovative
products, growth and inventive activity are sub-optimal. Obviously, since this
economy is working in a non-competitive framework, we shall expect it to be
also non-optimal. We may even expect a sub-optimal allocation of resources
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between the R&D sector and the goods sector 14. We will first review the role
that externalities play in new growth theories. We will then present the two
types of outputs (private and public goods) provided by the R&D activity.
The externalities Three different externalities have usually been noted due
to the R&D sector : the effect of the consumer surplus, the effect of the rent
diversion and the R&D effect. The first two externalities are pecuniary since
they are obtained through the normal functioning of the market and not from
exogenous factors. These externalities in a perfect competition framework do
not generate any inefficiency and the competitive equilibrium is pareto optimal.
The first externality is positive since the consumers and other users of the
idea profit from the difficulty that the inventors have to practice perfect price
discrimination. The second externality is negative since it represents the idea
that new technologies lead to the obsolescence of former technologies affecting
their owners. The last externality is positive and comes from the fact that
inventors profit from the use of their ideas in the production of goods but not
in the production of knowledge. The production of a particular idea profits to
all other would-be inventors.
Usually, it seems the global effect is positive although it is difficult to prove it
formally. Another externality can appear when exclusivity is partial and allows
for instance for imitation. In that case, private return of R&D will be lower
than its social return. Conversely, the reality of patent races exemplifies the
case where the first inventor, overtaking his competitors, gets exclusive rights
over its invention. In that sense, the incitation to be the first may conduct to a
private return over the social return.
In order to model these ideas, we cannot rely on the decreasing returns of the
neo-classical model. Two possibilities exist to escape them : learning-by-doing
or LBD (Arrow, 1962) and R&D (Romer, 1990). LBD fosters productivity
through experience and diffusion to other producers. The higher the global
stock of capital, the higher the level of technology of each producer. At the
aggregate level, decreasing returns may be avoided. R&D expenditures can
also raise productivity and permit to avoid decreasing returns at the aggregate
level. The lack of rivalry that characterizes new ideas is obvious in the case of
fundamental research.
In the case of R&D, knowledge in each firm is a collective good each other
firm can access at zero cost. In that sense, once discovered, new ideas diffuse
instantaneously in the economy. This also means that any change in the level
of the technology of the firm is similar to the acquisition of new ideas by the
economy as a whole, and hence, proportional to the change in the aggregated
14Empirical contributions include among others Backus et al. (1992), Kremer (1993) and
Jones (1995a, 1995b). Whereas Kremer acknowledges most of the conclusions of the new
growth theories, Jones attempts to weaken some of their assumptions. However, Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995) have shown that the critics of Jones rejecting the assumption of propor-
tionality between the stocks of human capital, knowledge and new goods, even when taken
into account, did not prevent the assumptions and conclusions of endogenous growth theories
to hold.
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knowledge capital stock. However, at the same time, firms try to protect their
discoveries with patents. Thanks to this limited and temporary protection,
technical diffusion is not immediate and innovators can keep their competitive
lead for a while. In this decentralized framework, this is indeed the single
incentive to pursue research. But then, the usual models of perfect competition
do not account appropriately for these interactions among firms.
The two products of R&D R&D is both a public and private good and
that makes it specific comparatively with other inputs. There is indeed a clear
distinction between knowledge and human capital. Human capital is both ri-
val and exclusive. Human capital and technology are two distinct inputs, since
human capital does obtain a market return in the research sector whereas tech-
nology can be acquired free of charge from a publication. So that technology
has the features of a public good when used in the R&D sector. There are no
diminishing returns in R&D activities with respect to the level of knowledge
capital. This implies that it is possible to sustain infinite growth in quality or
productivity by allocating a fixed amount of skilled labor to R&D activities.
This absence of diminishing returns with respect to reproducible factors of
production is central in allowing endogenous growth. However, in the manufac-
turing sector, the use of designs is subject to patents. Patents are infinitively
lived and carry a positive value because the attached durables can be sold or
rented for a profit to be used in the manufacturing sector. Patenting provides
the incentives for innovation and makes technology partially a private good. The
role of patents as a partially exclusive way of protecting inventions is central in
the analysis.
Innovation can follow a self-perpetuating process without interruption. In-
deed, thanks to non-rivalry, knowledge stock, associated with other traditional
factors, generate IRS, so that the marginal product of knowledge needs not de-
crease as more knowledge is accumulated. The technological spillovers combine
to form a stock of public knowledge, thereby lowering the cost of future in-
vention. This cost reduction compensates the tendency for the private returns
to invention to decrease as a result of increases in the number of competing
technologies.
Long-run growth can thus be sustainable since the increasing returns of
public knowledge offset the diminishing returns of private research. Moreover,
the partial non-excludability of knowledge implies that investment incentives
can be preserved thanks to partial protection. Product designs are proprietary
information because they can be kept partly secret or protected through patents
or copyrights. Inventors put a patent on the new good and thus retain monopoly
profits on its production.
In the models of product variety proposed by Romer (1990) or Grossman
and Helpman (1991a, 1991b, 1990a and 1990b), innovation permits to expand
the range of goods available in the market. Firms allocate resources to R&D in
order to invent new goods that substitute - but imperfectly - for existing brands.
Most importantly, technology results from investment made by forward looking,
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profit-seeking agents : this ”endogenizes” technological change. The complete
mechanism is as follows : producers of unique products earn monopoly rents,
which serve as the reward for their prior R&D investments. The innovative
products may be either final (as in Grossman and Helpman) or intermediate (as
in Romer) goods. In the latter case, then, innovation contributes to TFP in the
final goods sector.
The innovation process is set in motion as soon as each firm requires a new
idea (or the creation of a new unit of human capital) through R&D. Ideas do
not become exhausted since their potential stock is assumed unlimited and there
are thus no diminishing returns in the creation of knowledge. However, there
still exists incentives for innovators of doing research. Innovators can indeed
appropriate the returns to product-specific information which enables them to
manufacture new products, even if the returns to general information which
serves as an input in the inventive activity are impossible to capture. In that
sense, endogenous innovation is self-sustaining 15.
Each R&D project generates some additional knowledge that is potentially
useful to subsequent inventors and that enters the public domain. The contrib-
utors to the stock of knowledge cannot monitor the use of this public knowledge
nor enforce any property rights. Thus, knowledge capital is a public input into
R&D. An important assumption is that the knowledge capital stock is to be pro-
portional, at every moment, to the economy’s cumulative experience at R&D.
In particular, the stock of knowledge is to be proportional to the number of
R&D projects previously undertaken (so there are no diminishing returns to
learning). Finally, the cost of innovation is to be proportional to the stock of
knowledge. Eventually, capital accumulation occurs as a response to knowledge
accumulation, as technological innovations raise the marginal productivity of
capital and so make investment in machinery and equipment more profitable.
Since human capital is used intensively in R&D, a country with more from it
will innovate faster (and vice-versa for a country largely endowed in low-skilled
labor). An economy endowed with a larger stock of human capital allocates
more of this resource to R&D, the most human capital intensive of the economic
activities, and as a consequence its rate of innovation is higher (and vice-versa).
How to avoid the centre-periphery pattern then ? Thanks to the knowledge
spillovers through trade liberalization.
3.2.3 Trade and spillovers
The disparities among revenues over the world may be due to long delays of
knowledge diffusion between rich and poor countries. They may also be due to
the difficulty for poor countries to appropriate such knowledge because of bar-
riers to trade or lack of human capital able to translate these ideas into prod-
ucts. However, the progressive location of multinationals into poor countries
attracted by lower costs shall help the diffusion of knowledge and the gradual
catching-up. Technology shall then spread to other countries thanks for instance
15There is no product obsolescence in this approach, contrary to the model of quality ladder
(Aghion-Howitt, 1992).
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to imitation (cheaper than innovation) and allow for conditional convergence.
The geographical spread of the diffusion is an essential element when we will
deal with knowledge spillovers and their impact on international development.
Indeed, the empirical applications of these theoretical models shall try to model
these geographical features.
We have seen in the previous part that when the investment in R&D - at the
origin of technical change - has constant returns, long term growth becomes pos-
sible. We might wonder how fast new discoveries spread to other countries. In
our view, this is an important factor to permit convergence and the catching up
process of developing countries. Thanks to imports, countries may use implic-
itly foreign technology. Laggard-countries (so-called followers) can also catch-up
with the advanced countries (so-called leaders) thanks to imitation. In any case,
trade provides an opportunity to take advantage of knowledge spillovers at the
international level and symbolizes the benefits of economic integration 16. We
will first review the features of knowledge spillovers before studying their impact
in the context of economic integration.
Knowledge spillovers Diffusion of knowledge allows to build a higher do-
mestic stock of knowledge partly based on foreign-originated knowledge. This
stock helps to raise the productivity levels of each factor and of total factor
productivity (TFP). The latter being a clear indicator of development and com-
petitiveness. Knowledge diffusion aims at sharing ideas through diverse ways
of communication such as the spreading of new ideas thanks to journals (public
knowledge) or goods and services (private knowledge).
According to Marshall (1920), information flows are more intensive within
a country than between countries because it decreases over distance and bor-
ders. These flows of information and ideas are a clear incentive in concentrat-
ing economic activity in a single place (at least until congestion costs reverse
the trend). Whether communication works through face-to-face interactions
(requiring physical presence and possibly concentration) or telecommunication
(where physical presence and concentration are not compulsory) both are com-
plements rather than pure substitutes (Gaspar and Glaeser, 1997). National
diffusion shall be relatively more intensive in face-to-face interactions than in
telecommunication relatively to international diffusion.
Specialization in the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) setting is determined
by relative differences in factor endowments given equal technology. In a dy-
namic setting, we shall however envisage that technologies change thanks to
innovation. By improving the diffusion of knowledge we may better spread its
benefits. However, knowledge seems to be rather concentrated around few lo-
cations and there does not exist many efficient ways to force its spillovers into
action. Among these means we could think of labor mobility (workers carrying
their own knowledge and know-how) or trade in goods, services and capital that
16Empirical contributions include among others : Bayoumi et al. (1996), Coe and Helpman
(1995), Frankel and Romer (1999), Lichtenberg and de la Potterie (1996, 1998), Nadiri (1993)
and Nadiri and Kim (1996).
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contain knowledge. Both are limited by distance and all the usual impediments
to mobility. If we agree that goods carry knowledge, then the phasing out of
barriers to trade through its impact on trade and firm relocation, shall mod-
ify the diffusion of knowledge (according to the elasticities at work : see Dion,
2003a). All barriers to diffusion and more especially artificial ones can impede
economic growth.
International spillovers Traditionally, it is assumed that access to foreign-
made intermediate goods can raise productivity in manufacturing even in the
absence of international knowledge spillovers. However, if we allow for global
knowledge spillovers, then researchers can draw on a common stock of general
knowledge. In that case, integration boosts not only manufacturing produc-
tivity (by expanding the range of intermediate inputs available to a producer
of final goods) but also the long-run rate of productivity growth (by providing
access to the general knowledge generated abroad). Moreover, there shall also
be a positive effect of trade on the rate of technological progress in each country.
It arises because R&D is an activity with dynamic IRS (although its produc-
tion function is CRS at the internal level of the firm, it is IRS at the external
level). Nonetheless, in the case of local spillovers, national research productivity
accumulates in proportion to local R&D activity.
The opportunities to draw from the stock of global knowledge disappear
in case of isolation such as autarky. The more commercial interactions, the
higher the contribution to the local stock of knowledge. Trade in tangible as-
sets facilitates the exchange of intangible ideas (through personal contacts) so
that spillovers between two countries increase with the volume of their bilateral
trade. However, there may be a limit in terms of incentives to export your
knowledge. Indeed, a country that imports human capital-intensive goods finds
that international integration reduces derived demand for human capital and
thereby lowers the cost of innovation. But it works the other way round for the
country that exports these goods, because the exportables sector draws capital
away from research activities (cf. Stolper-Samuelson theorem).
Economic integration To evaluate the impact of economic integration on
growth through knowledge spillovers we shall use the progressive phasing out of
trade barriers. It seems that participation in world markets accelerates a coun-
try’s acquisition of foreign knowledge. Integration thus facilitates the trans-
mission of technical information, encourages entrepreneurs and innovators in
each country to compete and pursue new and distinctive ideas and technologies,
so that trade alleviates duplication of research effort. Reducing duplication of
research effort thanks to economic integration increases the aggregate produc-
tivity of resources employed in R&D. Thus, each R&D project contributes fully
to the global stock of knowledge capital (Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer,
1991a and 1991b).
Integration also enlarges the size of the market that means more sales and
greater profits for a given market share but also facing a greater number of com-
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petitors. The more rapid accumulation of knowledge implies a more rapid reduc-
tion in the cost of product development in each country, and so entrepreneurs
introduce new varieties at a faster pace. Integration increases the available stock
of knowledge. With a higher available stock of knowledge, the R&D cost di-
minishes (the cost of R&D in a location depends negatively on the number of
firms located in that location), new ideas and thus new firms are created in each
location with a relocation for some from North to South.
Concentration of industries, stock of high-skilled labor, expenditure share
of differentiated good, degree of increasing returns to scale (taste for variety)
in a region, all have a positive impact on its growth rate. Whereas the cost of
innovation and the rate of time preference have a negative impact. In welfare
terms, through openness, households have access to a more diversified set of
goods, and since they favor variety, this increases their level of utility (these
are the so-called static or temporary gains). The increase in the rate of utility
(the so-called dynamic or permanent gains) stems from trade in ideas and the
consequent higher global stock of knowledge. In addition, growth is increasing
in the share of industrial firms in trade partners. This is due to the role of
spillover intensity.
4 The synthetic framework
What have we learned from the two previous parts ? New growth theory deals
essentially with the consequences of economic integration on growth. New eco-
nomic geography studies mostly the impact of economic integration on the lo-
calization of economic activities. Both approaches seem thus complementary.
To specify their interdependence, we can either introduce location decisions in
growth models or dynamics in geography models. Recently, some authors have
noticed several links between the two sets of theories. These authors rely on
the circular and cumulative causality that connects growth and geography to
address the effects of economic integration on development 17.
Considering the inequalities exemplified by the specialization and concentra-
tion of certain activities in a limited number of countries, we may wonder how
to reverse them. Liberalization accompanied by technology transfer may spur
growth. This could lead to factor price equalization due to a shift in relative
factor endowments towards convergence 18. We are here interested in the way
17 In both the static and dynamic models, the spread of the spillover benefits across national
boundaries eliminates any tendency for the increasing returns activity to concentrate in a single
location. Conversely, because of factor price equalization (FPE), a core-periphery pattern is
possible : the equilibrium is highly asymmetric. When spillovers are limited, the innovator
can better appropriate the benefits of his invention, so that there is a trade-off between global
and local spillovers for welfare.
18Empirically, we know nowadays that convergence is conditional rather than absolute,
since it depends on specific features and different parameters among economies. Economies
are heterogenous so that their steady states may differ. The main idea remains, that the
further away the economy is from its steady state, the faster it will grow. The hypothesis
of a steady state is not only easier to model analytically, it is also confirmed by empirics
since growth per capita is positive but has no trend so the assumption that growth rates tend
20
economic integration affects development in poorer countries, but also how inte-
gration affects growth in richer countries. We argue that economic integration
may foster growth and reduce inequalities by decreasing the wage differential.
One of the main determinants of growth will be the level of transaction costs.
In order to model these effects we use the learning of new trade, new growth
and new geography theories in a common approach. We first recall the learning
from older theories (Section 4.1) before presenting the most recent approaches
that have attempted to build a synthetic framework (Section 4.2).
4.1 The old theories
Among the first attempts to connect growth and geography, authors such as
Marshall, Perroux, Myrdal, Hirschman or Pred have provided very useful frame-
works, whose insights lead current research. Indeed, the concept of cumulative
and circular causality has been often used to explain the reasons of convergence
and divergence between countries that were previously similar but overtime de-
parted and transformed into asymmetric countries.
4.1.1 Marshall
According to Marshall’s classification (1920), industrial districts arise because
of : knowledge spillovers (geographic proximity facilitates the spread of informa-
tion), advantages of thick markets for specialized skills (a concentration of firms
employing workers of the same type would offer labor market pooling : workers
would be less likely to remain unemployed if their current employer did badly,
and firms would be more likely to find available labor if they did well), and
the backward-forward linkages associated with large markets (a geographically
concentrated industry could support specialized local providers of inputs). We
note that whereas the first factor (the technological external economies or pure
spillovers) figures prominently in new growth models, the last two (pecuniary
externalities) are major contributors to new geography theories.
4.1.2 Perroux
Theories of polarization (Perroux, 1955) concentrated on factors that could
foster the transmission of growth. In that framework, economies of scale are
frequently invoked as an important cause of spatial polarization. The com-
plementarity between investment effects and pecuniary externalities (Scitovsky,
1954) rely on the effects of economies of scale. More generally, economies of
scale are at the core of any kind of polarization (Kaldor, 1970).
The relationship between industrialization and agglomeration is a famous as-
pect of development theories. Industrialization allows the collection of resources
in human, physical and knowledge capital in a specific location. The resulting
agglomeration will spur growth. However, this correlation between growth and
towards a constant over the long run is acceptable.
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agglomeration, also called circular and cumulative causality, does not say which
one causes the other.
4.1.3 Myrdal and Hirschman
The idea of cumulative causality and vertical linkages as factors of inequalities in
regional development goes back to the fifties (Myrdal, 1957; Hirschman, 1958).
According to Myrdal and Hirschman, economies of agglomeration trigger a pro-
cess of cumulative and circular causality that encourages economic activity to
concentrate in certain places. Regional inequalities - in the industrial structure
as well as in income levels - may then occur and display a (developed) core -
(developing) periphery setting.
Producers want to choose locations that have good access to large markets
and to supplies of goods that they or their workers require. However, a place
that for whatever reason already has a concentration of producers tends to offer
a large market (because of the demand the producers and their workers gener-
ate) and a good supply of inputs and consumer goods (made by the producers
already there). These are the backward and forward linkages of development
theory 19. Because of these linkages, a spatial concentration of production, once
established, may tend to persist, and a small difference in the initial economic
size of otherwise equivalent locations may grow over time implying a process
of circular cumulative causality. Theses ideas have benefited from the recent
renewal of economic geography and endogenous growth theories.
4.2 The new models
As soon as we acknowledge that the spatial distribution of economic activity
and economic growth are interconnected dynamics, the wish to associate them
within the same framework is tempting. The question then is from which setting
shall we depart ? From economic geography or from endogenous growth ?
4.2.1 From economic geography
Several empirical studies have underlined the benefit of combining growth and
geography framework to discuss development. The results of Jaffe (1989), Jaffe
and Trajtenberg (1999), Jaffe et al. (1993), Feldman (1994), Audretsch (1998)
or Audretsch and Feldman (1996, 1999) suggest that R&D not only spurs exter-
nalities but also that knowledge spillovers tend to be geographically localized in
the very same region where knowledge was created in the first place. Recogniz-
ing that the location of the innovative activity is central in explaining long-term
growth, some authors have been trying to insist on the geographic component of
growth. Building on new economic geography theories, Baldwin (2001), Baldwin
19We have seen earlier how Venables (1996) and Krugman and Venables (1995) had formal-
ized these links between downstream and upstream industries. The complementarity between
the decisions of localization of these firms leads to their agglomeration in a single (or limited
number of) concentrated location(s).
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and Forslid (2000a, 2000b) or Fujita and Thisse (2002) have proposed several
ways of introducing dynamic growth within a geographic setting. However, a
more promising path may be to introduce geographic features within a growth
framework.
4.2.2 From endogenous growth
Indeed, authors such as Martin and Ottaviano (2001, 1999), Baldwin et al.
(2001), Engelmann and Walz (1995) and Walz (1995, 1996, 1998) 20 have for-
malized the link between growth and geography by building models where the
geographic dimension helps explain the growth dynamics. What we suggest is
to pursue that path, by linking even closer the connection between the two while
introducing a new dimension thanks to the role of imitation into the model as
a supplementary factor of convergence.
Since we wish to deal with the effects of economic integration, we might
first wonder whether economic integration may affect the spatial distribution
of economic activity. It may do so through the modifications that the decrease
in transportation costs could introduce in terms of trade volumes. The latter
being often a metaphor for knowledge spillovers through knowledge contained
in traded goods. Policies seeking to increase volume or quality of trade may all
contribute to a new geography of economic activity.
4.2.3 A synthetic approach
Economic integration implies an increase in trade of goods, services, capital and
ideas (directly through people communicating and indirectly through goods,
services and capital). Economic integration usually has ambiguous effects : less
profit (more competition) and more profit (bigger market shares).
A synthetic approach (Dion, 2004b) builds on the ”new trade theory” (Help-
man and Krugman, 1985) which allows for IRS and imperfect competition. It
relates to the ”new economic geography” (Fujita et al., 1999) which formal-
izes that, as trade barriers go down, one should expect firms in IRS sectors to
relocate to the biggest markets (home market effect) and the ”new growth the-
ory” (Grossman and Helpman, 1991), that suggests that economic integration
through knowledge spillovers can avoid a core-periphery pattern.
In a synthetic model, we can indeed consider that in autarky or with rather
high trade costs, there exists vertical industry linkages that prevent a symmet-
ric equilibrium. This is due to the geographical concentration of the modern
sector itself caused by the linkages between research firms and producers of in-
termediate goods. The first link (cost linkage) comes from the high number of
intermediate goods producers that helps decreasing the innovation costs. This
shall attract research firms towards these intermediate goods industries. In the
same time, the presence of research firms that design new goods shall encourage
the demand for intermediates. This creates a second link (demand link) that
20Empirical contributions include among others: Eaton and Kortum (1995), Feldman
(1999), Keller (1998, 2000a, 2000b).
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attracts intermediate goods producers. The combination of these two links cre-
ates centripetal forces that lead to the agglomeration of the economic activity
in a single location 21.
The modern sector operating under IRS and being both a supplier and cus-
tomer of itself, we have vertical linkages that lead to agglomeration at least for
determined levels of trade costs. Indeed, if we consider that the North has more
intermediate goods than the South or the East, then its innovation costs shall
be lower. This implies that it should attract most of the research firms (cost
linkage). Moreover, the country endowed with the most research firms shall
also obtained the highest demand for its innovative products (demand linkage).
There is then a conflict between these opposite forces : centripetal forces lead-
ing to concentration and centrifugal forces (such as congestion costs and global
spillovers permitted by liberalization) leading to deconcentration.
However, in Dion (2004a, 2004b) we show that making the economy more
open makes its internal structure less geographically concentrated. By open-
ing the economy, centripetal forces (the benefice of proximity to suppliers and
consumers) are weakened and centrifugal forces (proximity to final consumer
demand) are reinforced 22.
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